— The Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) has repeatedly reported that another mobilization will be carried out in the Russian Federation. Any further information on when this will be launched? Perhaps this hidden mobilization has already started, and what number of people is expected to be involved?
— Yes, you are right, the mobilization measures in Russia actually did not stop after the announcement of the so-called partial mobilization (…). Recently, they have only intensified. In fact, the mobilization campaign and the preparation for a new wave of full-scale mobilization both continue. Of the latter, what is known for certainis (there are) documents from the FSB on travel restrictions for men, and corresponding mobilization measures, in particular in the region of the capital.
(There is also) the strengthening the formation of registers, particularly of minors aged 17, raising the conscription age and many other things, which today already allow us to say that the preparation for a new stage of mobilization in Russia has already been completed. … The military and political leadership of the aggressor state publicly talk about the formation of an army of one and a half million, (but) what in fact they have in mind is the formation of an army of two million. For this, a new wave of full-scale mobilization will certainly be organized.
Basically, this will mean not only the replenishment of personnel and mobilization, it also means a total curtailment, restriction of civil rights and freedoms, in particular the right to private property, which will apply to both large businesses and uncharitable small and medium-sized enterprises. And all those companies that did not support Putin’s war against Ukraine.
— When there was a previous mobilization, there was a lot of talk about the fact that Russia would not be able to raise 300,000, because the people were against it. But somehow it happened that 330,000 people managed to mobilize. From the information that you have now, I’ve heard the numbers that half a million soldiers are expected to be mobilized, how achievable is that for them now? What are the moods in society, how ready are they to go to military commissariats?
— Most of them are not ready to go, but the question is, who will ask them? We are lucky to live in a free, democratic state, just like residents of many developed countries. And residents of the Russian Federation, North Korea, and apparently now Belarus too, do not have such privileges. I think this is shown by both the interception and the communication with the prisoners, for many, especially the so-called partially mobilized, if they had a choice, they would not have ended up in this unjust, bloody and criminal war against Ukraine.
But they have no choice, and the gene of resistance in the modern Russian political nation has actually been destroyed. We see that those people who should protest are mostly trying to leave the territory of the so-called Russian Federation. This is the intelligentsia, the creative class, the middle class. And those who remain, meekly go literally to the slaughter, and put up with the fact that their relatives return home in plastic bags.
Nevertheless, it won’t be easy, there will be resistance, in particular, the national republics, the indigenous peoples, who already understand, at least their elites understand in many ways, that what’s at stake is the physical survival of their peoples. Of course, the Caucasus in particular, we have already seen examples of successful protests. At the same time, both the capital region and St. Petersburg retain some protest potential, so I think we may see some outbreaks.
— If we are talking about mobilization now, when will this new, fresh army be ready? Russia plans to train these people by the spring, or by the summer? How long will it take to prepare a new army?
— This is not a completely new army; it is a component and replenishment of the horde that already exists. And in this situation, in the second wave, maybe they will be lucky to learn and practice a little more, regardless of what they will still have to ride and shoot from. Because the issue of providing weapons, armored vehicles, and ammunition is already present in the Russian army today. But this first wave of mobilization, these 300,000, are precisely those who, as we see, are already being indiscriminately thrown to the slaughter in accordance with Putin’s intentions.
They are not trained to survive, to save life, because human life in the Russian army is worthless. They are being trained to die. And the level of training that is provided at the Russian and the Belarusian training grounds for the partially mobilized is not the level of training to survive, not at all. These are people who most likely will not return to their homes.
— You already mentioned it, do you have any information about the general situation with staffing in the Russian army? When this first mobilization took place, there were many photos circulating that their machine guns had already rotted, they were walking around wounded, naked and barefoot. But one way or another, this army somehow runs and advances on Ukrainian positions, and there are a lot of them, these soldiers. What can the new conscripts expect, will they have something to fight for?
— One way or another, we are dealing with a numerousl enemy and with an enemy whose weapons, albeit outdated, and not always of the proper quality, (come) in large quantities. In particular, there is still a lot of preserved equipment, which, even taking into account improper storage and losses, still quantitatively represents a threat to any army in the world. This is something that Ukrainians understand very well, as does the rest of the world.
Today, the events around Bakhmut and Soledar show very clearly that Putin decided for himself unequivocally to fight with manpower, to fight as Russians, regardless of ethnic origin, as citizens of the Russian Federation. They will compensate for a lack of equipment with the quantity of men, and are already doing it. Where there is a shortage of tanks and armored personnel carriers, they will simply throw in more “Ivans” as cannon fodder.
Regarding weapons, they are provided in numbers. For example, there are no problems with small arms in the Russian army. Quality is not always appropriate, and modernity is not even mentioned. Yes, they have colossal problems with uniforms, ammunition, and clothing, particularly seasonal. But who pays attention to it in the end?
But if a soldier is supposed to last at the front for a maximum of two weeks, what is the point of investing in modern weapons and ammunition? Therefore, the Russian command is not particularly concerned about this. And from those numerous interceptions that we hear, which are largely made public, this is very clearly and openly visible.
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